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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws-Constitutional Law-Federal Courts-Effect
of State Court's Refusal to Assume Jurisdiction
Plaintiff, a citizen of Virginia, sought to recover of the defendant, a
citizen of North Carolina, the deficiency remaining upon purchase money
notes given for a conveyance of real estate located in Virginia. The
contract of sale was for Virginia land, was made in Virginia, and was
to be performed there. Upon default on one of the notes and fore-
closure under an acceleration provision contained in the deed of trust,
the trustee sold the land and applied the proceeds to the payment of
the notes. There remained a deficiency and the plaintiff sought judg-
ment for the balance in the state courts of North Carolina. Recovery
was denied.' The court held that a North Carolina statute2 had de-
'Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. (2d) 411, 136 A. L. R. 1054
(1941).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-36. "In all sales of real property by mort-
gagees and/or trustees under powers of sale contained in any mortgage or deed
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prived the courts here of jurisdiction to give deficiency judgment. The
necessary jurisdictional amount and diversity of citizenship being pres-
ent, the plaintiff 'brought his action in the federal district court and ob-
tained judgment for the deficiency. Upon appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals it was Held:3 The interpretation given the statute by the
North Carolina court 4 to the effect that it applies only to the procedural
law of the state was binding upon the federal courts, and since the fed-
eral courts are bound to follow the state law only in substantive mat-
ters, while applying their own procedure, the statute would not bar
recovery.
Here we have a situation where the result reached depended upon
the forum one chose, which is opposed to the policy behind Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins5 and the cases furthering it.0 Paradoxically the
variance in this instance is the result of the federal court following the
"judge made law" of the state.
State courts have used at least three reasons for not applying the
conflict of laws rule that would call for an application of foreign law:
(1) A lack of jurisdiction in the forum court. (2) No form of action
to grant the relief.7 (3) Public policy forbids.8
of trust executed after February 6, 1933, or where judgment or decree is given
for the foreclosure of any mortgage executed after February 6, 1933, to secure
the balance of the purchase price of real property, the mortgagee or trustee or
holder of the notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall nbt be entitled
t6 a deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust or obligation
secured by the same."
' Angel v. Bullington, 150 Fed. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945) certiorari granted,
Dec. 8, 1945, 66 S. Ct. 231.
Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 20, 16 S. E. (2d) 411, 412, 136 A. L. R.
1054, 1056 (1941) ("It will be noted that the limitation ceated by the statute is upon
the jurisdiction of the courts .... This closes the courts of this state to one who
seeks a deficiency judgment on a note given for the purchase price of real prop-
erty. The statute operates upon the adjective law of the state which pertains to
the practice and procedure or legal machinery by which the substantive law is
made effective and not upon the substantive law itself. It is a limitation upon the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state.").
8304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
CCf. Guaianty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1470, 89
L. ed. 2079, 2086 (1945) ("The nub of the policy that underlies Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-
resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a state court a block away, should
not lead to a substantially different result.").
"Slater v. Mexican National Railway Co., 194 U. S. 120, 24 S. Ct 581 48
L. ed. 900 (1904) ; 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §608.1; GOODRICH, eoN-
FLIcr ov' LAWS (1938) p. 21; Howard Undertaking Co. v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 59
S. W. (2d) 746 (Mo. App. 1933).
'The following cases illustrate the variety of policies that have been invoked
to prevent the courts of the forum from recognizing foreign "rights." Gooch v.
Faucett, 122 "N. C. 270, 29 S. E. 362, 39 L. R. A. 825 (1898); Maxey v. Railey
and Bro. Banking Co., 57 S. W. (2d) 1091 (Mo. App. K. C. 1933) (gambling
debt) ; Security Co. v. Hendry, 189 N. C. 549, 127 S. E. 629 (1925) ; Young v.
Nave, 135 Kan. 23, 10 P. (2d) 23 (1932) (payment of attorney fees for the col-
lection of a note) ; Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604 (1935) (per-
sonal injury action by husband against wife); Commercial Credit Co. v. Higbee,
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In deciding that the statute was a limitation upon the jurisdiction of
the state courts the Supreme Court is within the rationale of the rule
that since jurisdiction is conferred on courts by the sovereign that created
them, the local law determines whether or not its courts have power to
entertain a given case.9  Thig method of not adjudicating foreign
"rights" was used where a statute 0 after defining a gambling contract
provides that the courts of this state have no jurisdiction to entertain
a suit upon a judgment based upon such a contract," the contract being
valid where made notwithstanding. A striking example of a state with-
drawing the jurisdiction of its courts to adjudicate a foreign right is
an Illinois statute' 2 providing that no action shall be brought in courts
of that state for wrongful death occurring elsewhere.'3 A court's dec-
laration that it is without jurisdiction to enforce a foreign "right" is
not often unexplained. More frequently the method is explained as a
means of effectuating public policy.' 4 The state court in the principal
case did not mention public policy, but rested its decision solely on what
it found to be a statutory withdrawal of jurisdiction, without explaining
why the legislature had so limited its power. But the bare fact that the
court construed the statute as closing the doors of the state courts to
this type of action is evidence of what the court thought the public
policy of the state to be, if not an actual declaration of it. However, it
1
92 Colo. 346, 20 P. (2d) 543 (1933) (conditional sales contract registered in for-
eign state but not in forum); Hudson v. Vonhamm, 85 Cal. A. 323, 259 P. 374
(1927) (action against father for tort of minor child) ; Ulman, Magil and Jordan
Woolen Co. v. Magill, 155 Ga. 555, 117 S. E. 657 (1923) (wife as surety for
husband).
There is a strong policy in every state toward recognizing validly created for-
eign "rights."
:3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §586.1.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §16-3.
" Burus v. Whitcover, 158 N. C. 384, 74 S. E. 11, 39 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1005
(1912). More difficulty was encountered when the illegal contract was the basis
of a foreign judgment, and the judgment was sued on here. Cf. Mottu v. Davis,
151 N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 972 (1909). Held: If the gaming question were raised
and decided in the Virginia decision it would be binding here See also, Cody v.
Harvey, 219 N. C. 369, 14 S. E. (2d) 30 (1941). Held: The trial court should
find the facts as to whether the plaintiff's claim was based on a gaming trans-
action, and if so whether tie question were raised by appropriate plea in the trial
of the case in the foreign court. Pleading the statute is in the nature of a plea
to the jurisdiction which cannot be conferred by a failure of the defendant to
plead properly. Note 18 N. C. L. REv. 224 (1940).1ILL. ANx. STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1934) c. 70 §2.Daugherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619,
L. R. A. 1915 F 955, Ann. Cas. 1913D 568 (1912).
The effect of the, statute was limited by Kenny v. Supreme Lodge of the World
Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U. S. 411, 40 S. Ct. 371, 64 L. ed. 638, 10 A. L. R.
716 (1920) holding that the statute could not constitutionally withhold jurisdiction
when the suit was on a foreign judgment.
"Gooch v. Faucett, 122 N. C. 270, 29 S. E. 362, 39 L. R.. A. 835 (1898);
Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 301 Mass. 275, 21 N. E. (2d) 244 (1939) ; Herzog v.
Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934) ; Weidman v. Wei'dman, 274 Mass. 118,
174 N. E. 206, 76 A. L. R. 1359 (1931) ; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179 (1857).
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is submitted that the statute could with equal logic have been construed
as fixing the substantive rights of the parties in purchase money mort-
gage transactions by limiting the creditor to the property conveyed, and
only applicable to transactions affecting North Carolina real estate. "
This was the position taken by the Oregon court in a like situation. 1
That court adopted the view that its statute was meant only to affect
real estate in Oregon, and did not establish a local policy against de-
ficiency judgments except for purchase money mortgages on land located
there.
Now that we have the state court decision characterizing the statute
as not affecting the substantive rights of the parties, but only the juris-
diction of the state courts, how does this construction affect the federal
courts sitting here? Since 1938, when the tables were turned and the
federal courts were required to follow the substantive law-including
the judge made law-of the state in which they are sitting, and their
own procedure, characterization of a matter as procedural or substantive
has become increasingly important. 7  To deny a litigant recovery in a
state court because to give relief would contravene some settled public
policy is a rule of conflict of laws which is a matter of substance to be
followed in the federal courts.'8 Whether the state court's refusal to
take jurisdiction, when not based on public policy, results in a rule of
substande to be followed in the federal courts is doubtful. Thus it was
held that the federal court sitting in Illinois was not deprived of juris-
diction by the Illinois wrongful death statute prohibiting such actions in
the state courts where the cause of action arose outside the state.19 But
whether the federal court has jurisdiction, and a determination of the
law it shall follow once it assumes jurisdiction, are separate questions.
Obviously the state can neither 'by statute nor decision deprive the fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction, that being the sole function of their creator.20
" Suppose a purchase money mortgage on North Carolina real estate and the
mortgagor has since moved to Virginia. It would seem odd that the statute should
not prevent a Virginia court giving a deficiency judgment if there remained a
balance after foreclosure here.
"' McGirl v. Brewer, 32 Ore. 422, 285 P. 208 (1930); but see, Federal Do-
positors Insurance Corp. v. Stensland, - S. D. -, 15 N. W. (2d) 8 (1944).
"
TSee, Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws (1942) 36 ILL. L.
REv. 493.
"' Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481, 134 A. L. R.
1462 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U. S. 487,
61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. ed. 1487 (1941). See also, Order of the United States
Commercial Travelers of America v. Meinson, 131 Fed. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 8th,
1942) ; Sampson v. Channell, 118 Fed. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. lst), 128 A. L. R. 394
(1940).
" Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western Railway, 110 Fed. (2d) 401 (C. C. A.
7th), 132 A. L. R. 455 (1940) (cert. dismissed under rule 35, 311 U. S. 720).
Since Illinois allows an action for wrongful death occurring within the state,
it is clear that the statute did not spring from public policy against such actions
as such, but was a court calendar relieving device.
1* 1 MooRxs FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) §2.07.
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The question in the principal case is not one of jurisdiction but rather
what is the law for the federal court sitting in North Carolina, after
assuming jurisdiction. Does the public policy of a state which is so
strong that by statute it has deprived its courts of jurisdiction to enter-
tain suits of a particular nature bind the federal courts sitting in that
state to follow the public policy of the state and refuse relief, although
the state court of last resort has interpreted such statute as not affecting
substantive rights but merely the adjective or procedural law? It was
decided in the Griffin2 ' case that it was for the state to say whether a
contract contrary to such a statute or rule of law is so offensive to its
view of public welfare as to require its courts to close their doors to its
enforcement. Once this is done the federal courts sitting in that state
are bound to follow such a conflict of laws rule. Should the fact that
the state court failed to mention, in construing a statute as dosing its
doors, the reason for such a statute, or the courts characterization of the
statute as procedural and not substantive, change the rule of law that is
to be followed in the federal courts? Obviously the fact that the state
court declared its courts without jurisdiction should not mean that the
public policy of the state is favorable to such actions. Neither is the
state court's characterization controlling in the federal courts.2 It has
been held by a federal district court that the Massachusetts statute
abolishing "heart balm" actions was such evidence of the public policy
of Massachusetts as to be binding on the federal courts, although the
cause of action arose outside Massachusetts and the state court had not
decided that an action of such nature could not be maintained in the
state court, where it arose in a state that allowed the action.2 It has
likewise been held that the federal district court sitting in New York
was bound to follow the New York state rule of forum. non con-
veniens and not assume jurisdiction over matters involving the internal
affairs of a corporation when in the view of the state court considera-
tions of efficiency, convenience or justice point to the courts of the
domicile of the corporation as the appropriate tribunals.
24
It is submitted that if the statute as construed by the state court is
21313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481, 134 A. L. R. 1462 (1941) cited
supra note 18.
"Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. ed. 1418
(1945); Sampson v. Channell, 110 Fed. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st), 128 A. L. R.
394 (1940). In both these cases the state court had called procedural what the
federal court was required to follow as substantive.
2
"Fahy v. Lloyd, 57 Fed. Supp. 156 (D. Mass. 1944); contra: Wawrzin v.
Rosenberg, 12 Fed. Supp. 548 (E. D. N. Y. 1935); noted 14 N. C. L. REV. 286(decided before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and the cases cited supra note 18).2 Weiss v. Routh, 149 Fed. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). But cf. Williams
v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326 U. S. - , 66 S. Ct. 284, 90 L. ed. 247 (1945)(The court left open the question of whether the federal court was bound to fol-
low the state's forum non conveniens rule.).
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constitutional it evidences a conflict of laws rule that is binding upon
the federal court sitting in this state. The constitutionality of the statute,
as construed by the state court remains to be discussed25 for obviously,
if the statute is unconstitutional as construed, the federal court should
not be required to follow it as evidencing a public policy or for any other
reason.
26
Generally speaking, the forum will apply the law of a sister state
which is the situs of a contract or other cause of action, but the ques-
tion here raised is to what extent the forum is compelled, by the federal
constitution, to apply the law of a sister state. The clauses most urged
as requiring the forum to adjudicate "foreign created rights" are the
"full faith and credit" and the "due process" clauses. 27 Just how far
these clauses require a sister state to adjudicate or recognize "foreign
rights" is not certain, and can only be determined by a process of in-
clusion and exclusion. That the full faith and credit clause applies to
judgments though the original cause of action could not be maintained
in the forum is settled ;28 and notwithstanding the inference in Anglo
American Provision Co. v. Davis,2 this rule cannot be flouted by the
simple device of withdrawing jurisdiction from the state courts3 0
A statute of a sister state must be given full faith and credit when
the forum does not have sufficient interest in the litigation to justify
overriding it for reasons of public policy ;31 and a state may not under
the guise of merely affecting the remedy deny the enforcement of claims
that are within this protection of the full faith and credit clause.3 2 The
dividing line between conflicting interest which determines how far a
state must go in recognizing a statute of a sister state has never been
clearly drawn, but has varied with the facts of each case. A share-
"' The court found this to be an interesting question that it was not called
upon to decide. Angel v. Bullington, 150 Fed. (2d) 679, 681 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945).
. It could hardly be argued that the state court's decision was res adjudicata
in the federal court, no decision on the merits having been given.
" The "privileges and immunities clause" has no application where the state
applies the same rule of law to its own citizens as to citizens from other states.
Chambers v. Baltimore and 0. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 28 S. Ct. 34, 52 L. ed. 143
(1917). Neither would the impairment of contract clause be applicable here, since
that clause applies only where the statute has been enacted since the contract
involved was made. New Orleans Co. v. Louisiana Co., 125 U. S. 18, 8 S. Ct.
741, 31 L. ed. 607 (1888), and here the statute was made specifically applicable
only to transactions subsequent to its enactment.
" Fauntleroy v. Lure, 210 U. S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. ed. 1039 (1908) ; cf.
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449, 48 S. Ct. 142, 72 L. ed. 365 (1928). Note(1928) 6 N. C. L. Rrv. 479.
0 191 U. S. 373, 24 S. Ct. 92, 48 L. ed. 225 (1903).
" Kenny v. Supreme Lodge of the World Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U. S.
411, 40 S. Ct. 371, 64 L. ed. 638, 10 A. L. R. 716 (1920).
"' Bradford Electric Light and Power Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 157, 52 S. Ct.
571, 76 L. ed. 1033, 82 A. L. R. 696 (1932) ; see Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial
Accident Comm., 294 U. S. 532, 55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. ed. 1044 (1935).
" Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 55 S. Ct. 589, 79 L. ed. 1100, 100 A. L.
R. 1113 (1935).
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holder's liability to pay an assessment levied in accordance with the
statutory law of the corporation's domicile must not be denied by a
sister state,m while statutory liability of a married woman on a guar-
anty for her husband need not be enforced by a sister state when to
do so contravenes its public policy 3 4 A state may refuse enforcement
of an insurance contract on the life of one of its citizens, because of
local policy against insurance without' an insurable interest according
to its law, even though, by the statutory law of a sister state where the
contract was made the beneficiary had such an interest.35 A statutory
right to interest on a judgment from the time an action is begun does
not override a sister state's policy against such interest calculation, when
the judgment is against one of the forum's corporate citizens.36 These
last two cases would indicate that the present trend is toward the con-
clusion that if the forum state has sufficient interest connection with the
persons, property, and events in the litigation to have a public policy
against the enforcement of rights under a sister state's statute the full
faith and credit clause does not require the enforcement of such rights.3 7
No case has been found to the effect that a state must give full faith
and credit to the common law of a sister state and it is probably under
such law that the plaintiff in the principal case depends for his right to
a deficiency judgment.38
In the principal case, if the cause of action 'became a "vested right"
only within Virginia it is not a deprivation of property without due
process of law for North Carolina not to recognize that right. Even if we
accept the view that Virginia could create a right operative by its own
power beyond her borders it could hardly be argued that North Car-
olina's failure to do anything about that right had deprived the plain-
tiff of property without due process of law. It is when a state has taken
foreign rights and with that basis has created a substantially different
right, by the elimination of a valid defense, that the due process clause
has been invoked to deny the forum the right to make over this obliga-
tion of the parties.39 No case has been found where this clause has been
:a Ibid.
'
4Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, 245 U. S. 412, 62 L. ed. 368, 38 S. Ct. 147
(1918).
as Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481, 134 A. L.
R. 1462 (1941), cited supra note 18.
"a Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct.
1020, 85 L. ed. 1487 (1941), cited supra note 18.7 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481, 1487, 134
A. L. R. 1462 (1941), cited supra note 35.
s See Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decision in
the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 533, at 545. "Refusal by
the courts of another state to give effect to such inchoate law could hardly be
described as a failure to give full faith and credit to a public act, record orjudicial proceeding."
"" John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 57 S. Ct. 129,
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held to compel a state to adjudicate a "foreign right."
Before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, a limited uniformity of law
within the federal courts was brought about by the application of the
"general law" doctrine. However, since that decision the emphasis has
been on uniformity between the state and federal courts within a given
state and the differences existing between the states, due to conflicting
laws or policies, charged to our political system.4 0 It would seem that
by the court's present interpretations of the full faith and credit or the
due process clauses the statute as construed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court is constitutional. It remains to be seen whether the
United States Supreme Court in the consideration of this case, now
before it, will see fit to extend the interpretation of these clauses so as
to preclude a state from assuming the position which North Carolina
has taken. CYRUS F. LEE.
Evidence-Negative Testimony-Silence as Hearsay
In an action to recover land sold in a tax foreclosure proceeding,
plaintiff sought to establish that the commissioner purchased at his own
sale through the wife of one L. L testified that his wife, now dead, did
not in his presence pay any consideration for the commissioner's deed
to her or receive any consideration for her deed to the commissioner,
executed a month later. L joined in the second deed and was present
when it was signed. L also stated that his wife did nothing but house-
work, that he knew she never inherited any money, that he never gave
her any large sum, and that he saw her every day. L's testimony (A)
that he knew all about his wife's business, (B) that he knew she neither
paid nor received anything for the deeds, and (C) that he never heard
her say she paid or received any money was excluded by the trial court.
The Supreme Court affirmed a nonsuit granted at the close of plaintiff's
evidence, and held the testimony above properly excluded by the ban
against hearsay.1 After referring to L's testimony about events occur-
ring in his presence, the court said: "Any other knowledge he had is
necessarily predicated upon hearsay, and is incompetent."2
(A)
A fundamental rule of admissibility is that a witness to a fact must
81 L. ed. 106 (1936); Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land
Co., 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. ed. 1178, 92 A. L. R. 928 (1934) ; Note
(1935) 13 N. C. L. Rav. 213; Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 50 S. Ct.
338. 74 L. ed. 926, 74 A. L. R. 701 (1930).
"0 Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020,
1022, 85 L. ed. 1487 (1941), cited supra note 36.
'Hinson v. Morgan, 225 N. C. 740, 36 S. E. (2d) 266 (1945); Hinson v.
Baumrind, 225 N. C. 740, 36 S. E. (2d) 266 (1945) (companion case).2Id. at 744, 36 S. E. (2d) at 269.
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